International Risk Management FAQ

The term "Malign Foreign Influence" is unclear and can encompass so many things. Can you help me understand what it is and why it should matter to me?

     Malign foreign influence encompasses activities that run counter to our core values in research integrity: objectivity, honesty, openness, accountability, fairness, and stewardship. When you host foreign graduate students, postdocs, and visiting scholars, you should be aware of certain activities that fall within the definition of malign foreign influence. These activities can take the form of reward, deception, coercion, or theft. Reward is the offering of material or social goods in exchange for desired behavior; deception is providing incomplete, incorrect information on an application, proposal, or publication for the purpose of hiding or directing attention away from some activity; coercion is the threat of harm or disadvantage for the purpose of enforcing compliance with a demand; and theft is the taking of a physical object or protected idea without permission of the owner.*

     Rewards can be recruitment programs, like Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs (FGTRPs), scholarships that provide tuition and stipend support for graduate students attending U.S. universities, or fellowships for postdoctoral scholars attending U.S. universities. None of these are necessarily a problem, except when they're used to compromise research integrity, such as promoting the unauthorized sharing of information, theft of material goods (e.g., samples or prototypes), etc.   

     Deception means practices in the research context that deliberately falsify or omit information to gain an advantage. Deception by omission can include the failure to report rewards or gifts, institutional affiliation, courses completed, etc. Deception by falsification can include providing deliberately false information on grant proposals or graduate school applications to increase competitiveness. Deception by omission is the most common type of omission, especially as foreign actors learn more about how the U.S. Government is confronting the issue of research security. For instance, an applicant may omit coursework in an area that they believe belongs on a government list of protected technologies (e.g., hypersonics). 

     Coercion is the practice of forcing an individual to do something by force or threat. The threat may be implicit or explicit and can range from social condemnation to physical harm. These threats can range from physical threats against a foreign student who does not toe the line on official governmental narratives from their home country (see, for example: Purdue Responds to Alleged Harassment of Chinese Student) to threats that scholarship or fellowship funds will be withheld if they do not report on their activities, gather requested information, or agree to return to their home country after completing their studies.

      Theft is the taking of intellectual property (IP) without permission of the principal investigator or host institution. Samples, prototypes, software, written documents, and ideas all constitute IP and, in fundamental research, these are the currency of academic achievement and their loss can affect promotions, tenure, and grant decisions. In contrast with private sector IP loss, financial considerations are usually secondary, but can be substantial to the university and investigator if an invention to be patented is compromised. Inadvertent IP theft can also occur if a scholar communicates the research group's activities outside the group. Principal investigators should ensure all members of their research teams - especially foreign members who may have different practices at home - understand expectations surrounding information sharing and data protection. IP theft also occurs when scholars who have been asked to perform a peer review on a publication or grant proposal transmit that confidential information to an unauthorized recipient.

*Definition and several subsequent definitions taken from the National Science Foundation (NSF) 2019 JASON report: Fundamental Research Security (nsf.gov)

Preventing malign foreign influence in university operations makes sense now. But what's the consequence if we let these things happen?

Obviously, there are different consequences for the varied scenarios or activities laid out above. However, the university is most vulnerable if one of its researchers omits pertinent information about foreign nexuses on a grant application. Not only will the researcher be subject to criminal and civil penalties (see Foreign Influence in the News), but the university itself could be implicated under the False Claims Act (FCA), which governs materially false statements or omissions that could "influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." There are many examples of universities that have had to repay enormous sums of money, i.e., up to three times the amount of the original award ("treble damage") plus additional penalties for each paid false invoice. It is critical that principal investigators and other key or senior research personnel be completely transparent in the university's conflict of interest forms and grant proposal disclosures. If, at any stage of an application, you are unsure whether you have an outside interest that should be disclosed, contact our office or simply err on the side of caution and disclose it.

More information on disclosure requirements can be found here and here.

I keep seeing information about Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs (FGTRP). They're legal, aren't they? What's the problem?

Yes, most foreign government talent programs are legal. However, there are ethical concerns of which you should be aware before you agree to participate in one. For instance, some FGTRPs operate with the intent to import or otherwise acquire from abroad, sometimes through illicit means, proprietary technology or software, unpublished data and methods, and intellectual property to further the military modernization goals and/or economic goals of a foreign government. Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to relocate physically to the foreign state for the above purpose. Some programs allow for or encourage continued employment at United States research facilities or receipt of Federal research funds while concurrently working at and/or receiving compensation from a foreign institution, and some direct participants not to disclose their participation to United States entities.

If you are considering an FGTRP, ORC&S recommends that you consult with your dean or department head before you sign any documentation. We also recommend that you attach the contract itself and any relevant email correspondence or program documentation to your Financial Conflict of Interest (FCOI) disclosure for our review.

The U.S. Government recognizes that "malign" FGTRPs are poorly defined. To that end, HR 5265 has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, its goal to clearly define and prohibit malign foreign talent recruitment programs. Further information on FGTRPs and other issues related to international risk management can be found in the National Science and Technology Council's Guidance for Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 33 on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development. 

What can I do to ensure my international research collaboration doesn't create any security or compliance issues?

The National Science Foundation's JASON advisory group's "Fundamental Research Security" report, linked at the end of FAQ #1 on this page, provides several example questions that researchers should ask before they embark on an international research collaboration. They are:

• Describe the engagement succinctly and without jargon. Is it fundamental research? If not, what are the institution’s policies around creating the engagement?
• Are the terms of the engagement made clear in writing? Have all the participants been identified? Are all participants known to the PI and the PI’s institution?
• Are all the participants' conflicts of interest and commitment documented?
• Are there any aspects of the engagement that are not to be disclosed to any of the participants? If so, what is the reason?
• Is there any aspect of the engagement that seems unusual, unnecessary, or poorly specified?
• Where does the funding and other resources needed for the activity come from? Is it clear what each party is providing?
• Are all the tangible assets of the engagement, existing or to be generated (e.g., data, metadata, profits, equipment, etc.), known? How will they be shared? Who decides how they are allocated?
• How does a participant end their engagement?
• Are scholars expected to reside away from their home institutions as a part of the engagement? If so, how are they chosen for participation in the engagement?
• What are the reporting requirements back to home institutions or organizations?
• Who will control the dissemination of the resulting fundamental research?

PIs are not currently required to address these questions. However, given the U.S. government's focus on stopping IP theft and other malign activities that the governments of China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and others routinely engage in and which undermine widely-accepted academic principles of openness and reciprocity, we urge your center, institute, college, or department to adopt them as a best practice. Please contact ORC&S if you have any questions.

Additionally, you should research whether the individual or entity you wish to collaborate with is on a U.S. government Entity List. U.S. export control laws generally restrict the export of technologies on a country-by-country basis. The Entity List catalogs over 1,000 people and organizations throughout the world for which more stringent export control restrictions are imposed. This means that even if an item could be exported to a particular country, that same item may not be exported to a recipient in that country if on the Entity List. The MSU Export Control Officer (ECO) can screen your potential collaborators against the Entity List and other pertinent government watch lists in advance and advise you of the risks. The Department of Commerce also maintains a searchable interface that includes the same information on the Entity List. 

A fundamental research collaboration with an entity or individual on the Entity List is legal; however, there are restrictions on interactions and such collaboration should be considered on a project-by-project basis through consultation with your department leadership and the ECO. Importantly, you must not ship or transfer any tangible physical items (this includes commercially-available goods as well as physical items that you create as part of your collaboration) to an Entity List institution. Also, except for publicly available information or the results of fundamental research, you generally may not furnish software, technical information, or research reports to an Entity List institution. 

Finally, you cannot collaborate or otherwise engage with an individual or entity on the U.S. Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list unless you receive specific authorization from the export control team and a license from the U.S. government. The SDN list contains names of individuals and entities targeted for special sanctions by the U.S. government. These include terrorist, drug traffickers, and state-controlled entities of sanctioned governments, among others. A license from the U.S. government to engage with an SDN is difficult to obtain and often requires several months of governmental review. If you have engaged with, or seek to engage with, someone on the SDN list, of if you're just unsure whether a potential collaborator is a SDN, please contact the MSU ECO for further guidance.